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Chapter Seven 
Aristotle, Kant, and the Ethics of the 
Young Marx 
Philip J. Kain 
I would like to argue that the young Marx's ethical views have been 
influenced not only by Hegel but even more so by Aristotle and Kant. 
Marx draws away from Hegel's concept of essence toward one more like 
Aristotle's , and he operates with a concept of universalization similar to 
that found in Kant' s categorical imperative. At the same time, Marx's 
task is to reconcile these Aristotelian and Kantian elements. 
Marx's main concern, however, is not simply to explain what morality 
is but to explain how it can be realized in the world. For us to understand 
his views we first must gain at least a basic understanding of what morality 
means for the young Marx. To do this we must examine several concepts 
and the way in which they are connected to each other: his concepts of 
freedom , essence, and the state. Then we will be able to understand his 
concept of universalization and will begin to see how it is like Kant's 
concept of a categorical imperative. Once we have taken these prepara-
tory steps, we can begin to talk about what really interests Marx, namely, 
how morality can be realized in society. Let us begin by discussing 
Marx's concepts of the state and freedom. 
I 
In his very earliest writings, by which I mean those written before the 
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law of 1843, Marx accepts a Hegelian 
form of state. For Marx, the state should be an organic unity that molds 
its members and institutions into a spiritual whole. It transforms individ-
ual aims and particular interests into general aims and universal moral 
concerns. It transforms "natural independence into spiritual freedom, by 
the individual finding his good in the life of the whole, and the whole in 
the frame of mind of the individual. " 1 
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Morality, for the young Marx-as for Hegel, Aristotle, and others-
only arises in a state, and moral theory is inseparable from social and 
political theory.2 Morality involves obeying universal rational laws, but it 
is not enough that these laws be subjectively rational, that is, based on 
the rationality of the individual. These laws and their rationality must be 
objective. They must be the public laws of the state, and reason must be 
objectified in the state's institutions. Only in this way can freedom be 
objective. It is only the state that is " the great organism, in which legal, 
moral, and political freedom must be realized, and in which the individual 
citizen in obeying the laws of the state only obeys the natural laws of his 
own reason, of human reason." The state must be the realization of 
reason; then morality will be the " principle of a world that obeys its own 
laws. " 3 
We can begin to understand this by looking at Hegel. He distinguished 
between Moralitiit , which is usually translated as "morality ," and Sitt-
Lichkeit, which is usually translated as "ethics" or "ethical life ." Moral-
itiit , which begins with Socrates and reaches its high point in Kantian 
morality, is individual, reflective, and rational. It is based on the auton-
omy of individual self-consciousness, on personal conviction and con-
science, and is a relatively late development in history . Sittlichkeit, best 
represented perhaps in the Greek polis before Socrates , is ethical behav-
ior governed by natural custom and tradition. It is based on habit in 
accordance with the objective laws of the community. Personal reflection 
and analysis have little to do with ethical life. 4 
Clear and simple examples of the difference between Moralitat and 
Sittlichkeit can be found in Plato. Euthyphro , for example, when he is 
asked to explain the meaning of a moral notion is quite able to expound 
at length on the customs, traditions, and myths that exemplify and 
underlie the notion-traditions that it has never occurred to Euthyphro to 
question, analyze, or reflect upon. This is Sittlichkeit. Socrates, on the 
other hand, forces Euthyphro to analyze and reflect. Socrates asks how 
we know that something is moral, why it is moral, what makes it moral; 
and it is clear that for Socrates only our own rationality can decide such 
questions. This is Moralitat. Again, in the "Myth of Er" at the end of the 
Republic, we meet a man who is about to select his next reincarnated life. 
We are told that in his previous life he had been a good man but only 
because he had been brought up in a good city. His ethical behavior had 
been based on custom, tradition, habit, and upbringing, not on philoso-
phy, reason, and reflection. He had behaved properly , but not because 
he knew what morality was. Consequently, possessing Sittlichkeit but 
lacking Moralitat, he chooses the life of a grand tyrant before noticing 
that it will involve eating his own children.5 
The task of the modern ethical theorist, for Hegel, is to reconcile 
Sittlichkeit and Moralitat. Sittlichkeit without Moralitat is inadequate. 
And, for Hegel, Moralitat without Sittlichkeit is impossible, as can be 
seen in Hegel 's critique of Kantian morality-the highest form of Morali-
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tat. In the Phenomenology, Hegel argues that it is impossible to discover 
one's moral duty simply by analyzing abstract principles to see if they 
are universal and noncontradictory. For example, both private property 
and its opposite-common ownership or the absence of private prop-
erty-are equally universalizable and noncontradictory. Without Sittlich-
keit-without an objective, immediately given, ethical substance embed-
ded in custom and tradition, which actually is rather than merely ought 
to be-it is impossible to discover one's moral obligation through analy-
sis. 6 Moralitat gets its content from Sittlichkeit. Moreover, Moralitat 
without Sittlichkeit would leave us with an inadequate form of freedom. 
Certainly for Kantian Moralitat, the individual is free; in fact, morality is 
based on freedom. But it is individual subjectivity alone that is free, the 
individual will deciding its action in accordance with reason. The individ-
ual is not necessarily free to realize the moral action. The world may well 
present obstacles to its execution without, for Kant, affecting the indivi-
dual's moral freedom in the slightest.7 For Kant, such empirical factors-
whether they be obstacles or aids-are irrelevant to freedom. Nor do 
feelings play a role. They need not agree with the action for it to be moral 
and free. Nor is our freedom affected if our feelings are opposed to the 
moral action. 8 But for Hegel and Marx, freedom is realized only when the 
objective external world and our feelings fit, agree with, and support the 
subjective rational freedom of the individual. Laws and institutions, 
feelings and customs, as well as the rationality of the individual, must 
form a single organic spiritual unity. 
Thus , for Hegel and Marx, freedom demands three things: (1) that the 
individual be self-determined by universal and rational principles; (2) that 
the laws and institutions of the state also be rational, so that in obeying 
civil laws you obey the laws of your own reason; and (3) that feeling and 
custom have been molded so as to agree with and support these rational 
laws.9 
For Kant, the possibility of freedom required that the transcendental 
self not be located in the natural, causally determined, phenomenal world. 
A noumenal realm, apart from the natural, was necessary as the source 
of self-determined free action . Many German philosophers after Kant 
(including Marx and Hegel), in rejecting the existence of an unknown 
thing-in-itself, 10 reject the existence of this noumenal realm and thus must 
have a different model of freedom. Rather than locate a transcendental 
self in a realm apart, they deny that there are such different realms and 
they view reality as a single field with two elements reacting against each 
other such that ultimately the natural objective element is absorbed into 
the conscious subjective element. In this way the object is no longer alien 
or other. They argue in various ways that the subject is the essence of the 
object-that it finds itself, its own rationality , in the object. Thus , the 
object is not heteronomous but compatible with the subject's freedom. 
For Hegel , this requires an Absolute Spirit or God, responsible for 
creating and molding the natural and social world through history . Ulti-
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mately, for the young Marx, the human species-through its Jabor-
constitutes, molds, and purposively controls the objective social and 
natural realm. 11 The subject exists and develops within the natural and 
social realm, but it also constitutes and comes to control it. The subject 
constitutes the object, objectifies itself in it, finds itself at home with it , 
and thus is free. 
The human species works on its world through history and transforms 
it to conform with its own essence, such that in confronting the world the 
human species discovers itself and becomes conscious of the power of its 
own rationality objectively embedded in that world. Freedom, in short, is 
this development and objectification of reason in the world. Realizing this 
and living accordingly is morality. 
For Marx in his earliest writings, " morality is based on the autonomy 
of the human mind" and freedom " is the generic essence of all spiritual 
existence." To understand Marx's ethics we must begin to understand 
his concept of essence and how it is linked to freedom and the state. In 
the first place , for Marx, essences develop. Freedom, for example, much 
as for Hegel , develops from being the special privilege of particular 
individuals to being a universal characteristic of all human beings. 12 Each 
sphere or institution in the state has its own essence that develops 
according to the inner rules of its life. This is its particular freedom , and 
it must be allowed to develop in its own particular way . For Marx, "only 
that which is a realization of freedom can be called humanly good. " 13 
Moral good, for Marx, is the realization of freedom. Freedom does not 
mean being unhindered in any and all ways, but it means the unhindered 
development of what is the essence of the thing. The realization of the 
thing's essence-its nature, what it inherently is-is the thing's good. 
As we shall come to see even more clearly, Marx's concept of essence 
is in many ways like Aristotle's. For Aristotle, the essence of a thing is 
formulated in its definition. The essence cannot be independent of its 
matter or substratum, but neither can it be defined in terms of its matter 
alone. The definition grasps the form of the thing. 14 For Aristotle, the 
thing is more properly said to be what it is when it has attained to the 
fulfillment of its form than when it exists potentially. The essence of the 
thing is exhibited in the process of growth or development by which the 
form or essence is attained. Each thing has a process, activity, or 
function; and when it fully achieves its proper activity or function, it 
realizes its essence and achieves its end or good. For human beings, their 
proper activity-their end, their essence-is activity in accordance with 
reason, and the realization of this end implies happiness. 15 In certain 
ways Marx's concept of essence is closer to Aristotle's than to Hegel's. 
For Marx and Aristotle, things exist on their own and have their own 
essence. For Hegel, at least ultimately, there is a single essence and this 
essence is identified with the Idea or God. 16 For Hegel, individual empiri-
cal things are products, manifestations , of the Idea. Marx criticizes Hegel 
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for turning things into attributes, predicates, of the Idea. Marx argues 
that this robs individual things of their own reality. 17 
On the other hand, Marx does not accept Aristotle's notion that the 
form or end of a thing is fixed and unchanging. 18 For Marx, essences 
change and develop through history. Furthermore, Aristotle does not 
have much to say about a link between freedom and essence, whereas, 
for Marx as for Hegel, there is an intimate connection between freedom, 
the laws of the state, and essence. 
In his earliest writings, Marx has not rejected law as he does later. 
Freedom exists in the state as law; in fact, a " statute-book is a people's 
bible of freedom." Laws are the positive universal norms in which 
freedom-the development of essence-acquires a theoretical existence 
independent of the arbitrariness of individuals. Universal laws embody 
essence; on the other hand, the particular interests of individuals are 
unessential, arbitrary , and accidental. To be led by particular interests 
rather than universal rational law is to be immorally , irrationally , and 
slavishly subordinated to a particular object. Laws cannot be subordinate 
to wishes ; wishes must be subordinate to laws. 19 Echoing Rousseau' s 
claim in Emile that subordination to persons is slavery while subordina-
tion to rational law is freedom, Marx holds that persons must not stand 
above laws nor can persons be a guarantee against bad laws or the misuse 
of laws. Instead, laws must be the guarantee against persons and their 
particular interests. For Marx, unconscious natural laws of freedom are 
formulated as conscious laws of the state. Laws are thus the reflection of 
actual life in consciousness. Since laws embody essence (which is to say , 
since they are natural), when the individual ceases to obey these laws of 
freedom the state can compel the individual to obey the law and thus, as 
for Rousseau, it compels the individual to be free. A civil law is like a law 
of nature. For example, it is like the law of gravity in that it confronts the 
individual as something alien and restrictive only when the individual 
attempts to violate or ignore the law. The laws of the state are the 
conscious expression of natural laws; they express the essence of things. 
The laws of the state do not regulate the legal nature of things; rather, the 
legal nature of things regulates the laws of the state. 20 
For Marx, there are two interconnected sides to any moral or political 
reality: an objective and a subjective side . To understand the objective 
side, a scientific study of the concrete empirical object itself is necessary. 
The subjective side requires the formulation of the essence of the object 
as a conscious, universal, and recognized law. On the objective side, 
instead of attributing everything to individual will, one must study the 
actual nature of the circumstances as these can independently determine 
the actions of individuals . Moreover, Marx thinks that such study can 
bring about the same degree of certainty as that achieved in natural 
science. He argues that the legislator, in order to formulate laws , should 
be a natural scientist. Civil laws are not made or invented any more than 
218 Part Ill, Marx and Aristotle 
the law of gravity is; the actual inner laws of social relations are discov-
ered and consciously formulated as civil Jaws.21 
Marx is willing to say that " in the political sphere, philosophy has done 
nothing that physics, mathematics, medicine, and every science, have not 
done in their respective spheres." Just as science emancipated itself from 
theology and established its own independent sphere, so modern political 
theorists proceed by deducing the natural laws of the state from reason 
and experience, not from theology. 22 
Once this objective concrete study of the particular essence of a specific 
object has been carried out, then, on the subjective side, the essence 
must be formulated conceptually and rationally as a universal law that 
becomes an ideal self-conscious image of reality and can be recognized 
as such. This subjective formulation is just as important as the objective 
study. As Kant said, freedom consists not in acting in accordance with 
Jaw but in accordance with the concept of law. 23 
Marx tells us that we must measure existence by essence. We must 
evaluate any particular reality by measuring it against its idea or con-
cept. 24 An essence is grasped abstractly and conceptually; it is the idea 
or concept of a thing-its definition, Aristotle would say- as opposed to 
its sensuous empirical existence. 25 Moral evil is the outcome of a state of 
affairs in which an empirical existent is shut off from and fails to live up 
to its essence. Marx later calls this failure alienation. On the other hand, 
moral good is the result of existence conforming to essence.26 Thus, for 
example, we can evaluate the moral worth of a state by examining its 
essence and asking whether or not the actual state fulfils, lives up to, or 
can be derived from and justified by this essence.27 
When we turn to a consideration of the human essence, we must add 
another concept. Anything, for Marx, is an aspect of the human essence 
if that thing is needed by the human being. The presence of need indicates 
that an existent is essential to a being: without it the being cannot have a 
full , realized, and satisfied existence. 28 If this need is frustrated, if it 
cannot be satisfied, or if its satisfaction frustrates other needs , existence 
is out of accord with essence, and alienation is present. 
We have already said that for Marx the human essence develops. 
Marx's concept of need is an important tool for understanding this 
development. New needs arise and are transformed in the context of 
evolving social conditions and relations. Moreover, new needs set the 
individual specific tasks and thus require transformation of the world if 
the need is to be satisfied. By following and understanding the reciprocal 
transformation of needs and of the world , we can chart the development 
of the human essence. Needs-for example, for food, human interaction, 
or education-are not satisfied in the same way and through the same 
cultural processes at all times. They have different contents and objects, 
and their satisfaction involves different sorts of activities. Thus for Marx 
the needs are different needs. 29 Even basic needs are different needs in 
different historical periods. 30 By understanding what at a particular his-
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torical point is experienced as a need, we then can understand the level 
to which the human essence has developed and the degree to which 
existence has been transformed to fit the level that essence has reached. 
We then can evaluate the situation morally. For example, by determining 
the specific character of needs generated in a particular society and the 
productive forces and social processes available for satisfying these 
needs, we can begin to discover to what extent needs are satisfied, and 
we can measure this against the degree to which needs can be satisfied, 
or should be satisfied. We can discover to what extent existence corre-
sponds to essence. 
Moreover, existing needs always point not merely to the past but to the 
future . They continually indicate how existence must be further trans-
formed to meet our needs and further realize our essence. The successful 
transformation of existence to satisfy a need will transform the need or 
allow new needs to be felt. This will give rise to a demand for a further 
transformation of existence. Humans always have a moral goal; they 
always are involved in transforming existence to fit their essence. 
How do we judge, once we have grasped the objective nature of a thing 
and formulated it conceptually as law, whether essence and existence are 
in accord? Here Marx has been strongly influenced by Kant, and we can 
begin to see how Marx's concepts of essence and freedom are linked to 
his concept of universalization. Marx holds that the test of whether 
existence measures up to essence is to compare form and content. The 
content of the law must not contradict the form of the law. The objective 
content of law arises from the particular nature-the actual life-of the 
thing in question. On the other hand, for Marx as for Kant, universality 
is the proper form that any law must have. 31 The content of law must be 
capable of being given a universal form without contradiction. The state 
and its laws must represent universal ends , not private or particular 
interests. If laws represent private interest (the interest of a special group 
or class opposed to others), the state becomes a mere means to further 
this private interest,32 and the content of the law contradicts the universal 
form of law. 
This concept of universalization can go some way toward distinguishing 
true from false needs-essential needs as opposed to mere whims that it 
would be foolish to take as essential. 33 Needs that we could will that all 
human beings develop and satisfy would be true needs . However, unlike 
Kant, universalization does not seem to be the sole criterion for Marx. In 
the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, his goal is to develop 
a human being rich in needs- a human being with as wide as possible a 
range of needs and the highest possible development of each need (as 
well, of course, as the means of satisfying them). It would also seem 
likely, since he is opposed to leveling and homogenization, that he is after 
diversity of needs. 34 Thus it would not make sense to limit true needs to 
those needs we would will that all human beings develop. Marx operates 
not just with a Kantian categorical imperative but with an Aristotelian 
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concept of essence, and the realization of one's essence calls for the 
development of needs that might not be universalizable. However, the 
principle of universalization can still operate here in a negative way. It 
can tell us that those needs whose satisfaction would contradict, hinder, 
or frustrate the development and satisfaction of the needs of others must 
be ruled out . Any needs that would not be objectionable in this way-
though we would not will that everyone develop them-would be true 
needs in the sense that they develop the human essence.35 
In further agreement with Kant, Marx holds publicity to be a test of 
Jaws. He holds that private interest " cannot bear the light of publicity." 
For Kant, any action that would be frustrated by publicly proclaiming it 
beforehand is to be considered illegal. This principle functions in the legal 
sphere much as the categorical imperative does in the moral sphere. Marx 
and Kant agree that only what is universal can stand the light of publicity; 
particular interests that contradict the general interest cannot: form and 
content would be in contradiction. For Marx , when laws are formulated , 
material content is idealized and raised to the conscious level of public 
universality such that a people can see itself, its essence , reflected in a 
mirror.36 
At this point, it should be clear that Marx in many ways agrees with 
the natural law tradition. He holds that there is an independent moral 
ground from which to judge the validity or justice of civil Jaws; laws are 
not valid simply because they have been properly instituted. He sees this 
normative criterion of civil law as rational and rooted in nature and, like 
many natural law theorists, sees a close relationship between descriptive 
laws of nature and Jaws as prescriptive social norms. Finally , as does 
much of this tradition, Marx holds a doctrine of essence-one very much 
like Aristotle's. 
Marx' s concept of nature is an unusual one, and is quite different, say, 
from Kant's. Laws of nature and civil laws that are like Jaws of nature 
are not opposed to freedom as " phenomena" is opposed to " noumena. " 
Such civil laws are laws of freedom given three conditions: (I) that these 
laws embody our essence (and our essence is natural ; we are parts of 
nature); (2) that these laws are universal and rational (not based on 
particular interest) ; and (3) that the unconscious essential laws of the 
object have been consciously recognized and publicly instituted as uni-
versal norms such that we act in accordance with the concept of law, not 
just in accordance with law.37 Marx is not confusing facts with values. It 
is not enough simply to follow nature or one's essence. One must 
rationally know what this essence is and act accordingly, in the sense 
that one's act is regulated by conscious, publicly recognized, universal 
principles . Yet in doing so, one's act does not stem from a realm outside 
of nature, as for Kant, nor is the act contrary to nature. The human 
being, including consciousness and reason, is a part of nature for Marx. 38 
Marx 's concept of e ssence makes possible the transition from fact to 
value. Much as for Aristotle, discovering the essence of a thing is to 
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discover what it is in fact, and this tells us what particular individuals of 
the species can become. It allows us to identify the range of possible 
development and the fullest development of the thing in a factual way. 
With human beings, reason can then seek to realize these possibilities. 
But why ought reason to seek this end? Why should it value such a goal? 
Reason must do so to realize itself. It too is a part of nature and has an 
essence to realize. If it does not do so, if it does not unfold itself (which 
is its natural course), we can say that it has been frustrated and is unfree. 
But this is still to say that it merely must or can realize itself, not yet that 
it ought to. If an acorn succeeds or fails in becoming a oak tree, we do 
not speak of the presence or absence of moral freedom. But if a human 
being-if reason-succeeds or fails in realizing itself, we do. Reason aims 
at its realization because of its nature . But this aim is not impressed on it 
from outside, nor is its aim immanent but unconscious. Because of its 
particular nature, reason can achieve its realization only in a particular 
way-consciously and freely. Here we can say legitimately that reason 
ought to realize itself, because it can realize itself only by acting con-
sciously and freely, and yet we also can say that it is its nature to do so. 
Marx's view, however, is even more complex than this. If to be actual, 
objects must be constituted and recognized, then facts are not simple 
givens. Natural objects , for Marx- and recall that the essences of natural 
objects are the basis for the formulation of civil laws-are not given 
factually , but constituted. Furthermore, our consciousness, our needs, 
and thus our values play a role in determining this constitution. Thus, we 
cannot have a neat distinction between facts and values. Nature is 
transformed and developed by human beings. This process is directed by 
their needs, which in part are needs for given natural objects; but labor, 
in satisfying need, transforms both the natural object and our needs and 
consciousness, and reciprocally our needs and consciousness play a part 
in constituting facts- natural objects. Thus, when we study natural ob-
jects-which already are value embedded-in order to grasp their essence 
and derive civil laws, we cannot say that we deduce moral conclusions 
from nonmoral premises. Facts and values interpenetrate all along the 
way . 
This would also be true for human beings. We have said that they are 
formed by their culture-by other human beings. The human essence, 
then, is not just factually given; it is constituted and developed by the 
social and cultural activity, the labor, of other human beings who form 
the culture we internalize. Moreover-since values and needs would 
obviously play a part in constituting culture-as we internalize this 
culture, our essence would be formed by these values and needs. Values 
then would be embedded in our essence. Fact and values would interpen-
etrate here too. So again, when we study the human essence so as to 
formulate universal moral laws, we would not be deducing moral conclu-
sions from nonmoral premises. 
It is true to say that we cannot deduce moral conclusions from non-
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moral premises. But it does not follow from this that we cannot derive 
values from facts. If a set of abstract premises could be exclusively 
factual and truly contain or imply no values , then we could not deduce 
moral conclusions from them. But if real world facts-especially if they 
are constituted by us- already have values embedded or implied in them, 
we can derive values from these facts . 
Thus, to say that morality means realizing one's essence does not mean 
that morality is being reduced to merely acting in accordance with nature 
or being determined by our nature. This alone would not make us moral 
or free . Our essence, it is true, is to be part of nature; but nature, 
existence, has been transformed to accord with it. Our essence has also 
developed, and consciousness was the most important factor in this 
development. As we have seen, in transforming our existence to suit our 
essence, we transform our world and thus ourselves in accordance with 
our needs and values. This is a process in which facts and values 
inevitably interpenetrate, mutually influence each other, and thus de-
velop. To fully realize our essence, this process finally must take place 
consciously and freely. We must discover and bring to consciousness the 
values that have been objectified in our world and formulate them as 
universal rational laws. If we regulate our actions in accordance with 
these laws, then we have realized our essence and are free and moral. 
Eugene Kamenka discusses these matters in a particularly clear way. 
His book on Marx's ethics39-especially chapter 9-is most impressive, 
though I am not in agreement with everything he says. In connection with 
the fact-value controversy, he points out that "good" has been treated 
both as a quality and as a relation. A scientific or an objective form of 
ethics can be established most easily if good is treated as a quality. Here, 
good is taken to be a characteristic that can be investigated in a factual 
way. Such an approach, however, destroys the illusion that there is 
anything about the good that logically implies or requires that we seek or 
support it. On the other hand, a traditional advocative conception of 
ethics is most easily established by treating good as a relation. Here, 
good is something for us-something demanded, required, or pursued, 
which it is wrong to reject. However, Kamenka suggests that, if good is 
treated as a relation and not a quality, there can be nothing objective 
about claiming the good should be sought. 
For Kamenka, ethics can be advocative or objective, but not both-as 
that would mean that good had to be both a quality and a relation. 
Kamenka thinks such an amalgamation is confused and would lead to 
treating relations as constituting the qualities of things. This position 
follows from a doctrine of internal relations, as Bertell Oilman points 
out.4° Kamenka argues that things cannot be constituted by their relations 
because a thing must have qualities before it can enter into relations. It 
must be something before it can be commended, rejected, or pursued. 
Qualities do not depend logically on relations, nor do qualities by them-
selves imply relations. 
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Thus Kamenka rejects a strict doctrine of internal relations of the sort 
Oilman attributes to Marx.41 Carol Gould has shown that Marx does not 
hold such a strict doctrine of internal relations in the later writings. 42 
Even in Marx's early writings , it seems to me that relations do not 
constitute qualities, though they do transform preexisting qualities. In 
particular, our most essential relation to things-labor-transforms the 
qualities of natural objects, of our needs, our senses, and our conscious-
ness. This is not, prima facie , an illegitimate way to link qualities and 
relations, facts and values. 
Kamenka seems to understand what Marx is trying to do, and he argues 
that to accomplish it Marx is driven to absorb all differences into a strict 
monism. Since Kamenka thinks that the only way to amalgamate qualities 
and relations, facts and values , is to hold that relations create or consti-
tute qualities, he holds that Marx is driven to the untenable position that 
all qualities must be absorbed into relations, that all differences between 
subject and object, the human being and nature, must disappear: they 
must be totally obliterated. The object must be totally absorbed into the 
subject.43 But this is not Marx's position. Marx holds very clearly in the 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts that an objective being, a human 
being, must be related to independent objects outside itself.44 Labor does 
constitute or absorb, but only by transforming preexisting qualities of the 
object. Thus, it does not obliterate all distinction between subject and 
object. It only unifies subject and object in essence. It overcomes the 
alienness of the object, not all difference. 45 
II 
We have said enough about Marx's concepts of freedom, essence, and 
universalization for us to have at least a basic idea of what morality 
means to him and now we can begin to discuss what he sees as most 
important, namely , how such morality is to be realized in the world. 
Marx is seeking an agent with certain characteristics-an agent capable 
of transforming society in a revolutionary way because this agent' s 
natural course, its essence, leads it toward the universal. Its activity and 
goal are moral because it is capable of reconciling essence and existence 
and thus of actually realizing freedom and morality in the world. In his 
Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, Marx finally 
decides that the proletariat is the historical agent he is looking for. 
Philosophical criticism, Marx argues, gives rise to a "categorical im-
perative" to overthrow all relations in which man is not "the highest 
being for man." Just as for Kant, human beings must be treated as ends 
in themselves. All institutions that treat humans merely as means must 
be transformed in a revolutionary way. If this revolution is to realize the 
categorical imperative that humans be treated as ends in themselves , then 
theory-the philosophical ideas of German Philosophy-must become a 
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material force. To do this, philosophical theory must grip the masses.46 
This can only happen if theory matches and realizes the needs of the 
masses. A fit between theory and need will close the gap between 
philosophical ideals and the world-between essence and existence. The 
universal-freedom and the categorical imperative--and particular needs 
will accord and promote each other. Marx tries to argue that the particular 
class interest of the proletariat truly accords with the universal: it accords 
with the categorical imperative. Marx's point is a very interesting and 
ingenious one. Because the proletariat is so oppressed, so deprived and 
degraded, its particular class interest-its selfish needs-are so funda-
mental that they could hardly be viewed as demands for special privileges. 
Such needs and interests would be the basic needs and interests of any 
and all human beings. They would be essential needs-needs for decent 
food, clothing, shelter, education, normal human development, and so 
forth- needs we would demand be satisfied for anybody. These would be 
needs that the categorical imperative would demand be satisfied for all. 
Because the proletariat is so oppressed, its particular interests corre-
spond with the categorical imperative. 
Thus Marx thinks that the proletariat " cannot emancipate itself without 
.. . emancipating all other spheres of society. " The proletariat " is the 
complete loss of man and hence can win itself only through the complete 
rewinning of man. " 47 Since the proletariat's needs are essential needs-
needs in accordance with the categorical imperative--if we can satisfy 
them, if we realize the universal, we can emancipate humankind gener-
ally. 
Nevertheless, one might object that there remains a fundamental differ-
ence between Kant and Marx. For Marx it is revolution that realizes 
morality, while for Kant revolution is rejected as immoral. This would 
seem to make their views quite dissimilar. But even here , if we carefully 
study Kant's views on revolution, we will find less of a difference from 
Marx than we might expect. 
Kant develops what he calls a " principle of publicity," which he thinks 
shows that revolution is illegal. The principle of publicity functions for 
legality much as the categorical imperative functions for morality. Any 
action that would be frustrated if it were revealed publicly beforehand, 
Kant holds, must be considered illegal. The principle as stated here is 
negative. It will tell us that actions incompatible with publicity should be 
illegal; but on the other hand, it is not the case that all actions compatible 
with publicity should therefore be considered legal . For example, a 
powerful government with a sufficiently strong army may well be able to 
reveal an oppressive plan without at all risking its failure. 48 The principle 
will indicate some but not all acts that should be illegal. 
Thus, for Kant, the principle of publicity shows revolution to be 
illegal.49 However, Marx employs a principle of publicity to support 
revolution. How is this disagreement possible? The answer, it seems to 
me, is that Kant has made a mistake. He confuses a revolution with a 
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and then independent market laws set in-market laws that cannot be 
controlled by any individual. Since human beings need these products 
but do not control them, they come to be dominated by the process of 
exchange. They are estranged. Moreover, since need indicates essence, 
the inability to satisfy need indicates that one's existence is estranged 
from one' s essence.53 
Again, since human beings need other human beings in many ways (to 
carry on production at anything more than the most minimal level; even 
to develop language; and, in short, to develop as human beings), then, 
given that need indicates essence, it follows for Marx that we are related 
essentially to others: the human essence is social. In an exchange econ-
omy these essential social relationships, Marx thinks, are estranged. 
Exchange and money, as they develop, stand between human beings and 
mediate-indeed, control-their interaction. This is quite visible during 
economic crises , but it occurs at all times. Humans are not free ; their 
essential relations are controlled by an alien power. 54 
Moreover, like Aristotle, Marx thinks that exchange perverts human 
virtue. Moral virtues no longer appear as ends to be sought but as means 
we are forced to use to achieve ends determined by the market. For 
example, in the relationship between lender and borrower (which Marx 
discusses at some length), normal human virtues are calculated in terms 
of potential credit risk. Trustworthiness, for example, no longer appears 
as a value or a virtue that is an end in itself; for the borrower it becomes 
a means to gain credit, and for the lender it appears as a means to ensure 
the likelihood of repayment. The value of a human being is estimated in 
money. Credit standards become the standards of morality; and human 
beings are viewed as elements , means, in an impersonal and alien process. 
Given the existence of human need and the lack of control over the 
products necessary to satisfy these needs, human morality will almost 
inevitably be shaped, dominated, and distorted by market forces .55 
So also, in a developed exchange economy, the . essential activity of 
human beings-which for Marx is their labor-no longer aims at produc-
ing products directly needed by the laborer. It no longer serves to realize 
the human essence. Labor and its product become a mere means to be 
exchanged for a wage to guarantee bare existence. Existence is not 
transformed and made a means to realize essence; rather, essence, 
essential human activity, becomes a means to preserve a minimal exis-
tence. For Marx as for Aristotle, production or " wealth-getting" directed 
toward the satisfaction of basic needs and the preservation of life or 
existence is, of course, necessary. But such activity is not properly one's 
highest end. It should be seen as the necessary basis for allowing one to 
proceed on to the sorts of activities involved in the good life-a life 
involving activities that are ends in themselves and thus the highest 
realization of one's essence.56 To turn these activities into means to mere 
existence is to turn things upside down and to fail to realize one' s essence. 
Again like Aristotle , Marx thinks that, without exchange, humans 
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would produce no more than they needed . The limit of need would form 
the limit of production. Production would be measured by need and thus 
by the human essence. This, for Marx, is real exchange-the exchange 
of labor for the product. In a market economy with wage labor, what is 
produced is not controlled by the wage worker. Here, need no longer 
measures production; but production, or the ownership of the product, is 
the measure of how far needs will be satisfied. Independent and alien 
forces determine the distribution of the product and thus the extent to 
which need and essence are satisfied .57 
There is another problem involved in exchange. Adam Smith, and 
Hegel as well, argue that in an exchange economy a common good is 
produced unconsciously through an invisible hand. Each seeks their own 
self-interest; but, given the complex interdependence of each on all, self-
seeking produces the common good more effectively than if individuals 
had sought it consciously. 
It is quite clear that Marx completely rejects the Smith-Hegel model 
for society. Moreover, his objection is in large part a moral one. As far 
back as Socrates, and certainly for Aristotle as well as for Kant, simply 
to produce a good, or to act merely in accordance with given moral 
expectations, does not amount to morality. To act morally, one must 
know rationally what the good is, and the act must be motivated by this 
rational knowledge. To act selfishly and allow a good to come about 
behind your back-no matter how effective it might be-is not moral. 
Morality requires conscious intent. We have already seen that to realize 
one's essence requires that this essence be grasped consciously and that 
one should set about transforming existence accordingly. The same 
applies at the social level.58 
It is true that Marx relies on self-interest rather than morality as the 
motive force of revolution (though morality and interests do converge). 
An invisible-hand argument has a legitimate place in explaining how it is 
possible to move from existing society to an ideal society because it 
allows us to avoid simply positing that people first must become ideally 
moral in order to realize the ideal society. But invisible-hand arguments 
have no place, for Marx, when discussing the ideal society itself. This 
society must be consciously and purposively directed. In fact , even when 
Marx does use ari invisible-hand argument, we must see that his approach 
is different from that of Adam Smith for whom competitive self-seeking 
unconsciously produces a common good. For Marx, while interests do 
unconsciously tend toward the common good or the ideal society, to 
move effectively toward this ideal society we must become aware of this 
tendency and assist it consciously. In his discussion of such an ideal 
society, Marx says, 
Let us suppose we had carried out production as human beings .. . . (1) In 
my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific charac-
ter, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life 
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during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the 
individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the 
senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. (2) In your enjoyment or use of 
my product I would have the direct enjoyment of being conscious of having 
satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's 
essential nature , and of having created an object corresponding to the need 
of another man's essential nature. (3) I would have been for you the mediator 
between you and the species, and therefore would have become recognized 
and felt by yourself as a completion of your own essential nature and as a 
necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know myself to be 
confirmed both in your thought and your love. (4) In the individual expres-
sion of my life I would have directly created your expression of your life, 
and therefore in my individual activity I would have directly confirmed and 
realized my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature. 
Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our 
essential nature.59 
Social relationships, for Marx, should be direct and conscious. The 
common good should not be produced through an invisible hand; the 
needs of others should be satisfied consciously and purposefully. Ex-
change should not be allowed to operate independently of human beings, 
out of their control, dominating and frustrating their needs, subverting 
human values and virtue, standing between human beings and dominating 
their interaction. Humans should consciously and purposively direct their 
own interaction. 
We have said that, since need indicates essence , the fact that humans 
need each other indicates that their essence is social. It is true that human 
need will produce social interaction whether human beings consciously 
regulate it or not. Humans must interact socially in order to produce, 
distribute products , and develop. If not consciously directed , this inter-
action will take the form of exchange, and market forces will come to 
dominate individuals and produce estrangement. If this interaction is 
cooperative, consciously controlled, and purposively directed, then soci-
ety (Gesellschaft) is transformed into a community (Gemeinschaft) . Con-
scious cooperative and purposive control of social interaction produces 
community. Marx clearly is arguing that a community-a communal 
organization of society-is the only sort of society that can realize the 
human essence; it is the only moral society. The human essence is 
communal. In general, essence is only fully realized if it is brought to 
consciousness and if existence is transformed to fit essence. To realize 
fully the human essence, social interaction must be understood con-
sciously and directed purposively. Society must be transformed con-
sciously. 60 In short, human interaction must be communal if existence is 
to accord with essence. 
Thus, Marx envisions a society in which need directly regulates pro-
duction. Individuals work not merely as a means to exist, but in order to 
satisfy and develop needs , that is, to realize their essence. The distribu-
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tion of products in this society should take the form of direct communal 
sharing purposively designed to satisfy the needs of others such that a 
conscious bond is formed. In such a society, one would recognize 
consciously as well as feel the power and importance of others who 
satisfy and develop one' s essence and one's own power and importance 
in satisfying the essence of others. Social relations would be moral 
relations. Relationships between individuals would be like the community 
of friends that Aristotle thought necessary for a good state. 61 Further-
more, community, for Marx, replaces the existing alienation of civil 
society from the political state. It transforms unconscious civil society 
into a consciously controlled and purposively directed economic com-
munity and eliminates the dominating estranged political state by making 
the universal elements of community and cooperation operative in day-
to-day life. 
Marx claims that the human essence is social, whereas Aristotle claims 
that humans are political animals. These claims may appear incompatible, 
but they are not. Aristotle do~s not make a distinction between the social 
and the political. Marx does distinguish between the two; but when he 
claims that the human essence is social, he is not opposing the social to 
the political, as he does when he opposes civil society to the political 
state. For Marx, both state and society are to be absorbed into commu-
nity. We certainly cannot say that, for Marx, the human essence is social 
as opposed to political or communal. The highest realization of society is 
community, and the political state involves community in an alienated 
form along with domination. To realize the human essence means to 
overcome the isolation of society as well as the domination and estrange-
ment of the political state by realizing community. The realized human 
essence is communal. For Aristotle, we can say that the " political" 
involves both communal interaction and domination-certainly the dom-
ination of slaves.62 Thus, both thinkers hold that realized human beings 
require community. The difference between Marx and Aristotle, then, is 
that Marx wants community without domination. However, at points, this 
even seems to be Aristotle's ideal. He says, "If ... every tool, when 
summoned, or even of its own accord, could do the work that befits it, 
just as the creations of Daedalus moved of themselves, or the tripods of 
Hephaestos went of their own accord to their sacred work ... then there 
would be no need either of apprentices for the master, or of slaves for the 
lords. " 63 
IV 
In the Comments on Mill and especially in the Economic and Philo-
sophic Manuscripts of 1844, we find clearly presented the very important 
concept of objectification (Vergegenstandlichung), which allows Marx to 
formulate many of his views in a sharper and clearer way. An object, for 
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Marx, is the result of an objectification: it is an entity necessary to 
maintain the existence and to satisfy the essence of another being. 
Objectification, for Marx, is the expression , manifestation, or realization 
of the powers of an entity in an object. For example, Marx says the plant 
has the sun as its object: the plant needs the sun to exist and grow. And 
reciprocally, the sun has the plant as its object: the sun realizes, objecti-
fies, its life-developing powers in the growth of the plant. For humans , an 
object is something needed by the human being to satisfy its essence and 
maintain its existence; food , for example, is the object of hunger. Humans 
also need objects in which they can objectify their powers-for example, 
raw material on which to work. Human beings must labor upon nature 
and transform it in order to satisfy their needs.64 They transform existence 
to suit their essence. The existing natural world is thus rearranged and 
formed through labor, fashioned into the sorts of objects that can satisfy 
the existing level of needs and essence. The need-satisfying object is the 
outcome, the product, of a process of objectification. Objectification 
begins with a subject whose powers, capacities, and ideas have developed 
historically to a given level as conditioned by the subject's social world-
its specific level of technology, organization of production, culture, and 
so forth. For these subjective factors (these powers, capacities, and ideas) 
to be objectified-that is, realized and developed-they must be set to 
work and produce an object. If they are not set to work, not exercised, 
they certainly do not develop , and in fact they really do not exist except 
in potential. One can identify the level to which these subjective factors 
have developed by studying the sorts of objects human beings are capable 
of producing. Furthermore, with the production of a new object-say, a 
tool-new powers and capacities will be called into play, exercised, and 
developed in using the tool; these then can give rise to new ideas and 
needs, which can call for further new objects and thus again new powers, 
capacities, and ideas to produce and use them. Needed objects promote 
the development of objectification, and objectification promotes the de-
velopment of needed objects. Existence is transformed, and needs and 
essence develop. 
To realize the human essence, for Marx, it is not only necessary to 
realize and to satisfy the needs of human beings, but it is also necessary 
to develop their powers. In fact, there is an intimate connection between 
powers and needs for Marx. The ability to realize any power would 
involve certain needs, as, for example, when workers need raw material 
in which to realize their labor. The satisfaction of any need would imply 
the maintaining, reinforcing, or realizing of a power, as, for example, the 
satisfaction of the need for food sustains workers' abilities to manifest 
their power through labor. Furthermore, the drive to realize any power, 
for Marx, would be felt as a need-not as a basic need, but as a higher 
need.65 It is important to notice that in the early writings the entire natural 
and social world is seen as the outcome of objectification; it has been 
progressively transformed by human labor into need-satisfying objects. 
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Raw, untransformed nature-Marx thinks-no longer exists, nor could it 
satisfy human need. 66 
It follows from this concept of objectification, for Marx, that humans 
can contemplate themselves in their object. They can view their entire 
world as something produced by themselves-the realization of their 
powers and ideas. They find the world to be a place that satisfies their 
needs and thus confirms and reinforces them. 67 Their existence has been 
transformed to correspond with their essence. Their objects are not alien 
and other; they are their essence. 
Moreover, for Marx, individuals should have the same relation to other 
human beings. Other humans are the individual's objects; they are needed 
by the individual. In a very interesting way Marx is trying to rid the terms 
object and need of their usual meaning. To say that humans are objects is 
not to say that they are things, or that they are needed as we need things, 
or that they are to be used as things. Objects, for Marx, are not means; 
they are ends. Objects are part of our essence. To say that other human 
beings (i.e., humankind , or the human species) are our object is to say 
that we need them. They are part of our essence. Without them, any 
complex production would be impossible, language would not exist, and 
individuals would not develop as human beings. Moreover, the human 
species is an object in the sense that human beings become what they are 
at any point in history by internalizing culture and society, which have 
been produced as the objectifications of other human beings. We are thus 
the products of the objectifications of the human species. So also we 
become what we are by exercising and objectifying the powers and 
capacities that have been produced in us and thus again influence and 
produce others.68 The products of objectification satisfy and develop not 
just the individuals who produced them, but others in society. Objects 
produced by others free us from the domination of need and allow us to 
pursue higher needs and thus develop higher powers, capacities, and 
ideas, which in turn make possible higher forms of objectification and 
thus a higher development of others as well as ourselves. The develop-
ment of the individual's needs and powers, the individual's essence, both 
is dependent on and contributes to the development of the species' 
powers and needs-the species' essence. Thus we can contemplate our-
selves-our essence-in other human beings , and the species in our-
selves. The species is the product of our objectification, and we are a 
product of its objectification. 
We have already seen that Marx wants social interaction to be commu-
nal, that is , conscious and purposive. To be free, individuals must 
consciously and purposively make the species their object or end. Marx 
claims that the human being is a species being and that a species being is 
a being capable of making its species the object of its theory and practice. 
This means that the ind.ividual is capable of conceiving a universal or 
general idea, that is, the idea of the species. Animals, unlike humans, can 
only conceive particulars. The human essence is identified by locating 
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the characteristics that distinguish humans from animals-the species 
from the genus. It is much like the Aristotelian notion that humans are 
rational animals. On the other hand, to make the species the object of 
practice means to make the species the end or goal of practical activity. 69 
Thus, to realize one's essence one must make the species the conscious 
object of theory and practice. Since the human essence only develops 
through the collective process of transforming existence to suit need and 
the objectification of its powers and capacities through labor, and since 
the development of the powers and capacities of the species is the 
outcome of the objectification of individuals whose powers are developed 
due to the objectification of the species, and since the realization of 
essence requires consciousness, it follows that the individual's fullest and 
highest development is dependent on individuals' making the develop-
ment of the species their conscious and purposive goal. 
Thus, to say that human beings are species beings, that they have a 
- _ species essence, or that human labor is species activity is a way of saying 
that the human essence is communal, that is , that social interaction must 
be conscious and purposive. Individuals are in essence what they become 
through interaction with others. To make the development of the species 
one's end is to make the development of one's own essence one's end or 
object. 
Marx's concepts of objectification and of species essence involve a 
view of freedom that in many ways is like that of Kant. Unalienated 
human beings are self-determined in the sense that they are not driven by 
need but regulate the satisfaction of need consciously. They are not 
dominated by alien market forces , but control their social interaction 
themselves. Such human beings are not determined heteronomously. 
Their activity is not determined by particular interests or individual 
needs, but is directed consciously toward the realization of the human 
essence, that is, toward the satisfaction of needs common to all, needs 
that can be universalized, needs whose satisfaction would be demanded 
by the categorical imperative. 
We must say a bit more about the relationship between needs and the 
categorical imperative. Kant, at least in the Critique of Practical Reason, 
admits that inclinations, interests, or needs are embedded in the content 
of any maxim. But to act morally and freely we must will to carry out the 
maxim not because of these interests, needs, or inclinations, but solely 
because the maxim is universalizable and thus rational. In other words , 
Kant has no objection to the fact that ends, interests , needs , goods, or 
purposes will be embedded in our maxims. They are expected to be 
there, but they must not be the elements that determine our will; only the 
possibility of universalizing the maxim without contradiction can do that 
if the act is to be free and moral . Perhaps the clearest example of this can 
be found in Kant's claim that the categorical imperative requires us to 
seek our own happiness. It is at least an indirect duty to seek happiness, 
not because we desire it (though, of course, we do desire it) , but because 
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it is impossible to universalize not seeking it. This too, I think, is Marx's 
view. We do not seek the object because it satisfies a particular need or 
interest of the individual (though, of course, it does so). That would be to 
be need-driven and dominated by the object. That would be heteronomy. 
We seek an object because to do so is universalizable, because the need 
for the object is common to all human beings, because it would be 
impossible to universalize not seeking the object, all of which is also to 
say that the object realizes the essence of the species. 70 
The categorical imperative applies to powers as well as needs. Even for 
Kant the categorical imperative would require individuals to develop their 
talents.71 But, for Marx, powers are not important merely for the individ-
ual. The powers of individuals affect and transform the sociocultural 
world that other individuals internalize. The entire sociocultural world is 
the outcome of what individuals have contributed to it through the 
manifestation of their powers, and this sociocultural world molds all 
individuals and makes possible the development of their powers . Thus, 
for individuals to seek their own realization, they must seek the full 
realization of the powers of other individuals-the powers of the species 
as a whole.72 This would require that we act on the universal-in accord-
ance with the categorical imperative, which would demand the realization 
of quite specific powers of any particular individual, since such powers 
could contribute to the development of the species. It would be society' s 
obligation to provide the conditions under which such powers could be 
realized. Moreover, as we saw earlier with respect to needs, Marx 
operates not just with a Kantian categorical imperative but with an 
Aristotelian concept of essence , and the latter would call for the devel-
opment of powers that we might not be able to will that all human beings 
develop but that nevertheless would develop the essence of the individual 
and conceivably contribute to the enrichment of the human species. The 
categorical imperative would, of course, also demand that those powers 
that would harm others should not be realized. 
Furthermore, despite the importance of objects, needs, and powers, 
Marx implies that it is species activity itself that is our highest goal. Much 
as for Aristotle , activities can have their ends or objects outside them-
selves, or the activity itself can be our highest end.73 For Marx, it is true 
that objects are ends-not means-and that activity cannot occur without 
objects and the satisfaction of needs; but it is the activity of producing 
objects and satisfying needs that is the highest end, and not the objects of 
particular interests or individual needs themselves. The end is a certain 
form of activity- activity that is free, that is , conscious and purposively 
directed toward the realization of the species. It would not be a means to 
something else, but an end in itself. Such action would not be heterono-
mously determined. 
At the same time, we can say that for Kant moral obligation is based 
not on seeking the good , but on freedom. We obey the categorical 
imperative because only by doing so are we rationally self-determined 
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and thus free . Here, too, we do not act to realize an external end; our act 
itself-freedom-is the end. For Marx, too, moral obligation is based on 
freedom in this way. Free species activity is itself the end. But this also 
means that the end is the realization of the essence of the species- its 
good. And only through the realization of the essence of the species can 
we realize our powers, capacities, and freedom-our own good. 
In this way, Marx links Aristotle and Kant. Realizing our essence is 
identical with acting on a categorical imperative. This identification is 
possible because Marx understands our essence as a species essence. To 
realize our essence, we must act consciously and purposefully for the 
benefit of the species. But to act for the benefit of the species is to act for 
the universal: it is to act on the categorical imperative. Such species 
activity is an end in itself. At the same time, to act for the universal is to 
realize the species and thus to realize one's own essence; and to realize 
one's own essence is to be free. 
Marx does not accept the Kantian notion of a noumenal realm. This is 
necessary for -Kant because without it we would be entirely situated in 
the phenomenal realm, and all of our action would be determined causally 
and heteronomously. Instead of a concept of noumena, Marx employs a 
concept of essence. In the absence of alienation, neither the object nor 
need for the object indicates heteronomy, because the needed object is 
not, in itself, heteronomous; it is part of our essence. 74 As we have seen, 
both the subject and the object are parts of nature, and the object is 
ontologically absorbed into the subject in the sense that the human 
species constitutes and comes to control collectively the objective world . 
It finds itself reflected in that world, and finds the world to be one with 
itself in essence. 
Kantian autonomy does not satisfy Marx, because only the intentions 
and volitions of the individual are free . In abstracting so radically from 
results, consequences, and goods, the individual-for Kant-is free even 
if the external world frustrates the realization of subjectively free activ-
ity. 75 Not so for Hegel and Marx. The external world-the object- must 
have been transformed to fit our essence. It must be a reflection of 
ourselves that reinforces and confirms us. The free action of the subject 
must be realized in the world for full freedom to be possible . Thus our 
relation to the object is not only a free relation but one that realizes our 
essence, and thus must be universalizable. 
My contention that Marx tries to link Aristotle and Kant can be 
reinforced by considering another issue. Marx implies in several places 
that species activity ought to lead to happiness or that it ought to be 
enjoyable and satisfying. 76 We have discussed already the relation of 
species activity to morality and freedom; we now must see how it is 
connected to happiness . 
Moral theorists view the relation of virtue to happiness in different 
ways. Some theorists tend toward identifying the two; others deny such a 
Aristotle, Kant, Young Marx 235 
connection. For example, Plato in the Republic (it seems to me) changes 
the normal meaning of happiness and redefines it so that it is identical 
with, or at least necessarily accompanies, virtue. The contemplation of 
the form of the highest good-grasping true being-necessarily involves 
true happiness. 77 There is no suggestion of this in Marx. Classical utilitar-
ians, on the other hand, define virtue so as to make it identical with 
happiness or at least hold that it follows necessarily from happiness. I 
will try to show that this is not Marx's view. Other theorists like Kant 
and Aristotle reject the tendency to identify virtue with happiness. 78 One 
can be virtuous without necessarily being happy, though one cannot be 
happy, at least in the highest sense, without being virtuous. To link virtue 
and happiness, further conditions are necessary. To use Kant's language , 
the connection between virtue and happiness is synthetic, not analytic. 79 
Though Marx does not discuss these matters explicitly, he seems to be 
closer to Aristotle and Kant than to the utilitarians . For example, in 
disagreeing with Proudhon he says that higher wages for workers would 
only produce better-paid slaves.80 In other words, higher wages and thus 
(certainly for utilitarians) greater enjoyment or happiness would be pos-
sible without affecting the fact that workers are alienated and unfree. But 
since, as we have seen, moral good requires freedom and the realization 
of essence,81 we can say that happiness without freedom is not a morally 
acceptable goal. It certainly would not realize the human essence. Again, 
in The German Ideology, Marx argues that the semi-artistic work of the 
medieval craftsperson was engaging and enjoyable but that this made the 
work even more slavish.82 In other words, to make alienated and unfree 
work enjoyable would be to tie the worker closer to such work and thus 
to increase the worker's slavishness. Marx also tells us in The Holy 
Family that capitalists are alienated in a market economy-just like 
anyone else-but may still be happy and satisfied. 83 Again, happiness 
without freedom is morally unacceptable. Morality cannot be identified 
with producing greater happiness. 84 
How then does Marx link freedom and morality with happiness in the 
ideal case? To answer this, we first must notice that happiness can be 
understood in at least two ways. Happiness can mean pleasure, the 
satisfaction of natural desires or needs, as it does for Kant and at times 
for Aristotle.85 Or it can refer to the satisfaction that accompanies a well-
performed activity, as it does in other places for Aristotle. The higher 
this activity-the more it accords with our essence-the higher the 
satisfaction or happiness.86 
Using the first definition of happiness, it is not easy to get morality and 
happiness to accord. For Aristotle, it is largely a contingent matter. The 
virtuous individual simply may suffer disappointment or pain. For Kant, 
the agreement of virtue with happiness is called the highest good. To 
realize the highest good, moral actions in accordance with universal 
rational principles would have to agree with the feelings or inclinations 
that produce happiness. For this to be possible, it would mean that the 
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natural world would have to be regulated so that the objects that deter-
mine feelings and inclination and thus happiness would always determine 
them in accordance with the demands of morality. For Kant, the highest 
good thus requires a postulate of practical reason- the existence of a 
God who would align nature and inclination with morality so that happi-
ness could accompany virtue.87 For Marx, we might say, the human 
species replaces Kant's God. The species itself remakes the natural world 
in accordance with its essence such that natural objects and thus the 
feelings determined by these objects would agree with the universal and 
conscious moral purpose of the species. The species , we might say, 
realizes the highest good. 
At this point we can see that the two forms of happiness can coincide. 
The satisfaction of need, interest, and feeling would occur as the species 
transforms its world to suit its essence. But, for Marx, our highest end is 
not the satisfaction of needs or interests; it is free species activity itself. 
Thus, the satisfaction or happiness that accompanies a well-performed 
activity- a satisfaction or happiness that is higher when the activity is 
higher or more essential-would also be present. 88 
We might also say that, for Marx, the species replaces Aristotle' s final 
cause-that highest being for whose good all action is done. It causes by 
being loved. Activity done for the final cause involves pleasure or happi-
ness.89 Much the same could be said of the species. 
Notes 
1. " Debates on Freedom of the Press," Marx- Engels Collected Works, here-
inafter MECW (New York: International, 1975-) , vol. 1, p. 135 , and for the 
German, Marx-Engels Werke, hereinafter MEW (Berlin: Dietz, 1972- ), vol. 1, p. 
31. " Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kolnische Zeitung," MECW 1: 193, and 
MEW 1: 95. "Wood Theft, " MECW I: 236, and MEW 1: 121. "Commissions of 
the Estates in Prussia," MECW I: 295- 96, and MEW, suppl. 1: 409- 10. 
2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, hereinafter NE, Bekker, pp. 1103b, 1179b-
l 180a; Politics, p. 1337a. G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of History , hereinafter PH, 
trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956) , pp. 38, 41 , 48, and for the Ger-
man, Siimtliche Werke , hereinafter SW, ed. H . Glockner (Stuttgart: Frommann, 
1927-), vol. 11 , pp. 70, 74, 82. 
3. " Free Press, " MECW 1: 162, and MEW I: 58 . "Leading Article," MECW 
l: 202, and MEW l: 104. " Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction," MECW 1: 
117-18, and MEW l: 12. 
4. PH 39-40, 104, 251- 53, 269, and SW 11: 71-72, 150-51 , 328-31, 350. 
G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right , hereinafter PR, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1967) , pp. 36, 91- 92, 103- 9, and for the German, 
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts , hereinafter GPR, ed. J. Hoffmeister 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955), pp. 49- 50, 122- 23, 140-48. 
5. Plato, Euthyphro, 4B-16A; Republic, 619B- 619C. 
Aristotle, Kant, Young Marx 237 
6. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, hereinafter PS, trans. A. V. 
Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 257-61, and for the German, 
Phiinomenologie des Geistes, hereinafter PG, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 1952), pp. 306-11. 
7. I. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, hereinafter F, trans. 
L. W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), pp. 10, 16, 66, 80- 81, and for the 
German, Kants gesammelte Schriften, hereinafter KGS, ed. Royal Prussian 
Academy of Science (Berlin: Reimer, 1910-), vol. 4, pp. 394, 399-400, 448, 461. 
I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, hereinafter CPrR, trans. L. W. Beck 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), pp. 3-4, 71, and KGS 5: 3-4, 68-69. 
8. F 10, 13-17, 44, 53- 54, 60-61 , and KGS 4: 394, 397- 401 , 426, 435, 442. 
CPrR 28, 31 , and KGS 5: 28-29, 31. 
9. PH 38-39, and SW 11 : 70-71. PR 160-61, and GPR 214- 15. These three 
characteristics also can be found in Aristotle, though he is discussing virtue not 
freedom; NE 1179b-1180a. 
10. F 69-73, and KGS 4: 450- 54. CPrR 28, 50, and KGS 5: 28-29, 48. That 
Marx rejects an unknown thing-in-itself, see Dissertation, MECW 1: 39-40, 63-
65 , and MEW, suppl. I: 271-72, 294- 97. Also see the German Ideology , MECW 
5: 264n, 273-74, 292, and MEW 3: 247n, 254-55, 273, where Marx rejects Fichte' s 
version of the thing-in-itself. 
11. PH 17, 438-39, and SW 11: 44-45, 549. PR 30-31, 35 , and GPR 41-43, 47. 
PS 479, 481, and PG 549, 551. Dissertation, MECW I: 52, and MEW, suppl. 1: 
284. For a fuller discussion of Marx's position, see Philip J. Kain, Marx' Method, 
Epistemology, and Humanism (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986), ch. 1. 
12. "Prussian Censorship," MECW 1: 119, and MEW 1: 13. "Free Press," 
MECW 1: 151-53, 155, 158, and MEW 1: 47-49, 51 , 54. PH 103-4, and SW 11: 
150-51. 
13. "Free Press," MECW 1: 159, 173-74, and MEW 1: 54, 69-70. 
14. Aristotle, Metaphysics , pp. 983a, 996b, 1017b, 1031a; Physics, p. 194a. 
15. Aristotle, Physics, p. 193b; Metaphysics, pp. 1013a- 1013b, 1014b, 1015a; 
NE 1098a. 
16. This is suggested in "Free Press," MECW 1: 173- 74, and MEW 1: 69-70. 
It is quite clear in the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, MECW 3: 7-9, 39, 
and MEW 1: 205-8, 240-41. Also see The Holy Family, MECW 4: 57-61 , and 
MEW 2: 60-63, where Marx rejects Hegel's concept of essence but not all 
concepts of essence. However, in 1837 and at certain points thereafter, Marx 
seems to hold Hegel's concept of a single essence; see "Marx to His Father on 
10-11 November 1837," MECW 1: 18, and MEW, suppl. 1: 9; "Leading Article," 
MECW 1: 195, and MEW 1: 97. PH 9-10, 27, and SW 11: 35-36, 56. G. W. F. 
Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers (London: 
Allen & Unwin , 1966), vol. 2, pp. 15, 162, and for the German, Wissenschaft der 
Logik, ed. G. Lasson (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969), vol. 2, pp. 3- 4, 158-59. 
17. PH 50-51, and SW 11: 84- 85 . Moreover, for Hegel, the Idea manipulates 
the historical conflict of particular interests in order to realize itself; PH 20, 22-
23 , 25, 33 , and SW 11: 48, 50-51, 54, 63. 
238 Part III, Marx and Aristotle 
18. Aristotle, Physics, pp. 198b-199b; Metaphysics, pp. 1033b, 1039b; Politics, 
p. 1256b. 
19. "Free Press," MECW 1: 162, and MEW 1: 58. "Wood Theft," MECW 1: 
262, and MEW 1: 147. " Divorce Bill," MECW 1: 308, and MEW 1: 149. See also 
PH 39, and SW 11: 71. 
20. J. J. Rousseau, Emile, trans. B. Foxley (New York: Dutton, 1966) , p. 49, 
and for the French, Oeuvres completes (Paris: Gallimard, 1959-), vol. 4, p. 311. 
"Free Press," MECW 1: 162, and MEW 1: 58. "Wood Theft," MECW 1: 227, 
243, and MEW 1: 112, 128. "Divorce Bill," MECW I: 308, and MEW 1: 149. 
21. "Marx to His Father," MECW 1: 12, and MEW, suppl. 1: 5. "Free Press," 
MECW 1: 167, and MEW I: 63. "Divorce Bill," MECW 1: 308, and MEW 1: 
149. " Justification of the Correspondent from Mosel," MECW I: 337, and MEW 
1: 177. 
22. "Leading Article," MECW I: 200-201, and MEW 1: 103. 
23. "Free Press," MECW I: 162, and MEW I: 58. "Divorce Bill," MECW 1: 
308, and MEW 1: 149. F 29, 45, and KGS 4: 412,427. 
24. Dissertation, MECW 1: 85, and MEW, suppl. 1: 326-29. "Free Press," 
MECW 1: 154, and MEW 1: 50. "Liberal Opposition in Hanover," MECW 1: 
264, and MEW, suppl. 1: 387. "Divorce Bill," MECW 1: 308-9, and MEW 1: 
149-50. 
25. "Estates in Prussia," MECW 1: 295, and MEW, suppl. 1: 409. " Divorce 
Bill," MECW 1: 309, and MEW 1: 149-50. 
26. Dissertation Notes, MECW 1: 448-49, and MEW, suppl. 1: 106-7. "Free 
Press," MECW I: 158- 59, and MEW 1: 54. "Divorce Bill: Criticism of a 
Criticism," MECW I: 274, and MEW, suppl. 1: 389. "Divorce Bill," MECW 1: 
307-9, and MEW, suppl. 1: 148-49. 
27. "Leading Article," MECW 1: 199- 200, and MEW 1: 102- 3. 
28. "Free Press," MECW 1: 137, and MEW I: 33. Also "Comments on Mill's 
Elements of Political Economy," MECW 3: 218-20, and MEW, suppl. 1: 452-54. 
29. Marx makes this point most clearly in the Grundrisse, trans. M. Nicolaus 
(London: Allen Lane, 1973), p. 92, and for the German, Grundrisse der Kritik der 
politischen Okonomie (Frankfurt: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, n.d.), p. 13. 
30. German Ideology, MECW 5: 256n, and MEW, 3: 238-39n. 
31. "Marx to His Father," MECW I: 15, and MEW, suppl. I: 5-6. "Prussian 
Censorship," MECW 1: 121 , and MEW I: 15 . "Wood Theft," MECW I: 231, 
and MEW I: 116. CPrR 26-29, and KGS 5: 27-29. 
32. "Wood Theft," MECW 1: 241,245,259, and MEW I: 126, 130, 143-44. 
33. For an example of the distinction between true and false needs, see 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3: 324-26, and MEW, 
suppl. I: 564-67. 
34. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts , MECW 3: 294- 96, 304, and MEW, 
suppl. I: 534-36, 544. 
35. Thus, we might distinguish between (1) needs common to all, whose denial 
we could not universalize, e.g., the need for food, (2) needs of particular 
individuals, groups, or classes whose satisfaction would frustrate the satisfaction 
of needs of others-that is, needs whose satisfaction we could not universalize-
Aristotle, Kant, Young Marx 239 
e.g., needs involved in pursuing economic exploitation, and (3) particular and 
even unique needs not opposed to the needs of others whose denial or satisfaction 
it does not make sense to universalize, e.g ., a scholar's need for an unusual 
manuscript (also see W. K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 32-33). However, it is not clear that Kant would be 
unable to accommodate this third category. He argues that an individual cannot 
without contradiction will to leave a talent undeveloped (F 40-41, and KOS 4: 
422- 23). Even if such an accommodation could be worked out, for Marx unlike 
Kant, there are still two factors present-the principle of universalization, and 
the realization of essence-and these two converge. All of this, of course, 
assumes a society able to satisfy needs . In a society of scarcity we might not even 
be able to satisfy those universalizable needs (even needs for food) we would will 
to satisfy. 
36. I. Kant, " Perpetual Peace," hereinafter PP, in On History, ed. L. W. Beck 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp. 129-30, and KOS 8: 381-82. "Wood 
Theft," MECW 1: 261, and MEW 1: 145. Also "Prussian Censorship," MECW 
I: 121 , and MEW 1: 15. " Free Press," MECW 1: 164-65, and MEW 1: 60-61. 
37. "Free Press," MECW 1: 162, and MEW 1: 58. 
38. Dissertation, MECW 1: 65, and MEW, suppl. 1: 297 . Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts, MECW 3: 275-76, 336, and MEW, suppl. 1: 515-16, 
579. 
39. E. Kamenka, The Ethical Foundations of Marxism, 2nd ed. (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972). 
40. B. Oilman, Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 45-49. 
41. Kamenka, Ethical Foundations, pp. 89-94. 
42. C. Gould, Marx's Social Ontology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,. 1978), 
pp. 38,40,87, 184n. 
43. Kamenka, Ethical Foundations, pp. 95, 99, 110. 
44. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, MECW 3: 336-37, and MEW, 
suppl. l: 578-79. 
45. For a discussion of related issues , see Kain, Marx' Method, Epistemology, 
and Humanism, ch. 1. 
46. "Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law," MECW 3: 
182, 187, and MEW 1: 385, 391. 
47. "Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law," MECW 3: 
186-87, and MEW 1: 390-91. Also Holy Family , MECW 4: 36-37, and MEW 2: 
37-38. 
48. PP 129-31, 133, and KOS 8: 381-83, 384-85. 
49. PP 130, and KOS 8: 382. 
50. PP 134, and KOS 8: 386. 
51. PP 87, and KOS 8: 345. Both Rousseau and Marx also advocated citizen 
militias instead of standing armies; see J. J. Rousseau, The Government of Poland, 
trans. W. Kendall (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), pp. 80 ff. , and Oeuvres 
completes, vol. 3, pp. 1013 ff. K. Marx, Civil War in France, in Writings on the 
240 Part III, Marx and Aristotle 
Paris Commune, ed. H. Draper (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 
73-74, and MEW 17: 338-40. 
52. Kant seems to come very close to holding this in "Old Question," in On 
History , pp. 143-45, and KGS 7: 85-86. 
53. " Comments on Mill ," MECW 3: 212, 218, 220, and MEW, suppl. 1: 446, 
452, 454. 
54. "Comments on Mill," MECW 3: 212-13 , 217-20, and MEW, suppl. 1: 446-
47, 451-54. 
55. " Comments on Mill," MECW 3: 214-16, and MEW, suppl. 1: 448-50. 
Aristotle, Politics, p. 1258a. 
56. "Comments on Mill," MECW 3: 219-20, and MEW, suppl. 1: 453-54. 
Aristotle , Politics , pp. 1257b-1258a. Unlike Aristotle, Marx in the early writings 
does not distinguish labor from leisure as he will later in the Grundrisse. The 
good life, for Marx-the realm of ends in themselves-is to take place within a 
transformed and humanized labor time; see MECW 3: 227-28, and MEW, suppl. 
1: 462-63. 
57. "Comments on Mill," MECW 3: 224-25, and MEW, suppl. 1: 459-60. 
Aristotle, Politics, pp. 1256a-1258b. 
58. "Comments on Mill, " MECW 3: 217, and MEW, suppl. 1: 451. See also 
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, MECW 3: 56-57, 119, and MEW 1: 259, 
324. "Marx to Ruge in September 1843," MECW 3: 144, and MEW 1: 345- 46. 
Plato, Republic, 619B-619C. NE 1105a, 1139a, 1169a. F 6, 13, 29, 45, and KGS 
4: 390,397, 412,427 . 
59. "Comments on Mill," MECW 3: 227-28, and MEW, suppl. 1: 462-63. 
60. " Comments on Mill," MECW 3: 217-18, 227- 28, and MEW, suppl. 1: 451, 
462-63. 
61. NE 1155a, l 159b-l l 60a; Aristotle, Politics, p. 1280b. 
62. Aristotle, Politics , pp. 1252a, 1253a, 1280a. 
63. Quoted from K. Marx, Capital, ed. F. Engels (New York: International, 
1967), vol. I, p. 408, and MEW 23: 430. Also see Aristotle, Politics, p . 1253b. 
64. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, MECW 3: 272, 336-37, and MEW, 
suppl. I: 511-12, 578-79. 
65. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, MECW 3: 304, 336, and MEW, 
suppl. I: 544, 578 . 
66. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, MECW 3: 273, 303-5 , 345-46, 
and MEW, suppl. 1: 512-13 , 543- 46, 587-88. 
67. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts , MECW 3: 277, and MEW, suppl. 
I: 517. 
68. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, MECW 3: 278-79, 298-300 and 
MEW, suppl. 1: 519, 537-40. " Comments on Mill," MECW 3: 227-28, and MEW, 
suppl. I: 462-63. 
69. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, MECW 3: 275-77, and MEW, 
suppl. 1: 515-17. 
70. CPrR 34-35, 72-76, and KGS 5: 34, 69-73 . F 15, and KGS 4: 400. I. Kant, 
Religion within the Limit of Reason Alone, trans. T. M. Greene and 
H. H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 4 , and KGS 6: 4. For a good 
Aristotle, Kant, Young Marx 241 
discussion of these matters , see J. Ebbinghaus, "Interpretation and Misinterpre-
tation of the Categorical Imperative,'' in Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays , 
ed. R. P. Wolff (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 220-27 . See also L. W. 
Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 96, 162. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 
MECW 3: 275-77, and MEW, suppl. 1: 515-17. 
71. F 40-41, and KOS 4: 422-23. 
72. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, MECW 3: 333, and MEW, suppl. 
1: 574. 
73. " Comments on Mill," MECW 3: 228, and MEW, suppl. 1: 463. Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts, MECW 3: 276, and MEW, suppl. 1: 515-17. 
Aristotle, Metaphysics , p. 1048b; NE 1094a; l097a-I098a, 1176a-1176b. 
74. "Comments on Mill," MECW 3: 218, 228, and MEW, suppl. l: 452, 462-
63. Also Dissertation, MECW 1: 52, and MEW, suppl. l: 284. 
75. F 10, 44, 53-54, 60-61, and KOS 4: 394, 426, 435, 442. CPrR 28, 31 , and 
KOS 5: 28-29, 31. 
76. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, MECW 3: 239, 278, 298- 301 , and 
MEW, suppl. l: 475, 518, 537-41. "Comments on Mill," MECW 3: 227- 28, and 
MEW, suppl. 1: 462-63. 
77. Plato, Republic, 585A-585B. 
78. F 10-12, 15, 35-36, and KOS 4: 395-96, 399, 417-18. CPrR 96, and KOS 5: 
93. 
79. CPrR 115 , 117, and KOS 5: 111 , 112-13. Aristotle does , in effect, define 
happiness as activity of the soul in conformity with virtue (NE 1097b-1098a, 
1177a), and thus it might seem that the Link between virtue and happiness is 
analytic for him. But elsewhere in the text we see that virtue is not quite a 
sufficient condition for happiness; a virtuous person who, for example, lacks a 
certain amount of wealth, who suffers, or who lacks health will not be happy (NE 
1153b, I 178b-1179a). 
80. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts , MECW 3: 280, and MEW, suppl. 
I: 520-21. 
81. " Free Press ," MECW I: 158-59, and MEW 1: 54. 
82. German Ideology, MECW 5: 66, and MEW 3: 52. 
83. Holy Family, MECW 4: 36, and MEW 2: 37. 
84. These examples suggest an interesting point, namely, that alienation is not 
a psychological category for Marx. To be alienated does not mean necessarily 
that we will be aware of being alienated or feel miserable, or unhappy. Moreover, 
to overcome alienation it certainly is not sufficient to end misery or unhappiness. 
Workers content with their jobs are not necessarily unalienated. Alienation, most 
basically, means being unfree, and we can easily be unfree without being aware 
of it, just as we can be either happy or unhappy in our unfreedom. On the other 
hand, to overcome alienation does require that we become aware of it and 
understand its causes. 
85 . F 35-36, and KOS 4: 417-18. CPrR 35, 129, and KOS 5: 34, 124. NE 11 53b, 
1178b-1179a. 
86. Hegel, too, holds both views; see PS 375 , and PG 435. Also PR 83, and 
242 Part III, Marx and Aristotle 
GPR 127. It is true that " satisfaction that accompanies a well performed activity" 
is Aristotle's definition of pleasure (NE ll74b-ll75b), which is not to be simply 
identified with happiness. But pleasure is certainly linked with happiness (NE 
1153b), and it is a necessary ingredient of it (NE 1177a). In trying to define 
happiness, Aristotle identifies the proper function of the human being a~ activity 
in conformity with a rational principle or with virtue. Happiness then arises out 
of the performance of these activities, especially when they are performed with 
excellence (NE 1097b-1098a, also 1076a- 1077a). When discussing pleasure as the 
satisfaction that accompanies a well-performed activity, Aristotle is discussing a 
broader sort of satisfaction arising from activities that need not in the strictest or 
highest sense be rational and virtuous. But if they are, then pleasure coincides 
with happiness. Indeed, there is nothing objectionable about this. Aristotle says 
we can choose pleasure partly for itself and partly as a means to happiness, 
though we never choose happiness as a means to pleasure (NE 1097b). Happiness 
arises out of the highest sorts of activities-activities that are ends in themselves 
and that accord with virtue and rationality (NE 1176b). And this happiness 
involves the highest form of pleasure (NE 1177a). 
87. NE 1153b. CPrR 119, 123, 128-30, 133, and KGS 5: 114-15, 124-25, 128-
29. 
88. " Comments on Mill," MECW 3: 227-28, and MEW, suppl. I: 462-63. 
89. Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 1072b. 
